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In this work, the algebraic properties of the local transition functions of elementary cellular automata 
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1. Introduction 
As is well known, Boolean functions play an important role in symmetric cryptography: for 
example, suitable Boolean functions are consideredascombining functionsoflinear feedback shift 
registers (LFSRs for short) in stream ciphers, or as basic functions involved in S-boxes in block 
ciphers. The cryptographic usefulness of Boolean functions is measured by some cryptographic 
characteristics. The most important of these properties are the following: high algebraic degree, 
balancedness, high nonlinearity, resiliency, higher order propagation criteria and the non-existence 
of non-zero linear structures. In order to resist modern cryptanalytic attacks (based on linear 
approximation and differential characteristics), highly nonlinear Boolean functions with good 
propagation criteria and less linear structure are basically needed. 
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The main goal of this paper is to study the cryptographic properties of the local transition 
functions defining the elementary cellular automata (ECA). Roughly speaking, cellular automata 
are, in the simplest case, a finite collection of two-stage elementary cells arranged linearly in a 
lattice and locally interacting in a discrete time step. The state of each cell is synchronously updated 
according to a Boolean function whose variables are the states of the neighbour cells. Cellular 
automata have been widely used in symmetric cryptography as pseudo-random bit generators 
(see, e.g. [6] and the references therein), the design of secret sharing schemes [11], the design of 
message authentication protocols [14], etc. 
A particular and interesting type of cellular automata are ECA for which the local transition 
function depends only on three variables: the states of the main cell and its two nearest neighbours 
[25]. As a consequence, it is a three-variable Boolean function and there exist 223 = 256 ECA. 
As it was mentioned before, there are several papers proposing cryptographic algorithms based 
on cellular automata. In fact, in some of them, ECA are used. More precisely, we can find a lot  
of works dealing with the statistical properties of the ECA as generators of pseudorandom bit 
generators for cryptographic uses (see, e.g. [7,20,21,23,24] and the references therein). Also, some 
applications to the design of block ciphers have been published [15,18]. However, there are very 
few works studying the basic cryptographic properties of the local transition functions defining 
ECA (note that they are three-variable Boolean functions). To our knowledge, there is only one 
work dealing with this problem: it is due to Martin [10] and he explores all these Boolean functions 
- using the Walsh transform - in order to find out correlation-immune ones for generating good 
pseudo-random sequences with use in stream ciphers. In this work, we extend the study of ECA 
to other cryptographic properties regarding not only stream ciphers but also block ciphers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the mathematical background on 
Boolean functions and ECA is introduced; the main cryptographic properties that a cryptographic 
function must satisfy are shown in Section 3; in Section 4, we test these properties for the local 
transition functions of ECA; finally, the conclusions and future work are presented in Section 5. 
2. Mathematical preliminaries 
2.1 Boolean functions 
An n-variable Boolean function f is a function from the vectorspace F2, formed for all binary 
vectors of length n, to the finite field F2 = {0, 1}. The set of all n-variable Boolean func-
tions is denoted by BF
 n and its cardinal is \BF n\ = 22 n. The Hamming weight of a vector 
x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) e F n2 is the number of its non-zero coordinates, whereas the Hamming weight 
of an n-variable Boolean function f is defined as 
wH(f) = \{x e F2 such that f( f(x) = 0}\, 
that is, it is the cardinal of its support. Furthermore, the Hamming distance between two Boolean 
functions f,ge BF
 n is dH(f, g) = w H(f © g), where (f © g)(x) = f(x) © g(x). 
The usual representation of a Boolean function f is by means of its algebraic normal form 
(ANF for short) which is the n-variable polynomial representation over F2, that is: 
f(x1,...,xn) = ^ ai1i2^^ik • xi1 • xi2 x i k , 
1<k<n 
1< i1 , i2 , . . . , i k <n 
where ai1
 ik ^ F2. The degree of the ANF is the algebraic degree of the function. The 
simplest Boolean functions considering their ANF are the affine functions: f(x1, ..., xn) = 
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a1x
 1 © a2x2 © • • • © anxn © a0,wherea0, a1, ..., an e F2.Ifa0 = 0, we have the linear functions 
and are denoted by la(x) with a = (a1,..., an) e F2. 
The discrete Fourier transform is the linear mapping that maps any pseudo-Boolean function 
φ: F2 ^ R to the function 
φ^: Fn ^ R 
u I—> φ(u) = y^^(—1)x • uφ(x), 
xeFn
 2 
where x • u stands for the usual inner product. We can apply the discrete Fourier transform 
to a given n-variable Boolean function f, and the function obtained is denoted by f. Notice 
that f(0) = wH(f) and dH(f, g) = w
 H(f (B g) = (f + g)(0). The discrete Fourier transform  
can also be applied to the pseudo-Boolean function fχ (x) = (—1)f(x) (called the sign function) 
instead of f itself. Then, it yields: 
f: Fn ^ R 
u I—> f(u) = y (—1)x • uf(x), 
xeF n 
and it is called the Walsh transform of f. The Walsh transform of a Boolean function has some 
interesting statistical properties [10] that permit to test whether such boolean function is balanced 
or correlation-immune. 
The derivative of the n-variable Boolean function f with respect to b e F2 is other Boolean 
function denoted by Dbf and defined as follows: 
Dbf: F n2 —> F2 
x I—> Dbf(x) = f(x) © f(x © b). 
The linear kernel of f is denoted by C]C(f) and is defined as the following subspace of F n
 2: 
C]C(f) = {b e F2 such that Dbf is a constant function}. 
Every element b e C]C(f) is called the linear structure of f. 
2.2 Elementary cellular automata 
ECA are finite state machines formed by m memory units called cells that are arranged linearly. 
Each cell assume a state from the finite state set F2 at every step of time. The state of the i th cell 
at time t is denoted by sit e F2 and it changes synchronously in discrete steps of time according to 
a local transition function f. This function is a three-variable Boolean function whose variables 
are the previous states of the main cell and its two adjacent cells, that is: 
f: F32 —> F2 
(sU,sit,sit+1) ^ sit+1 = f(sU,sit,sit+1) 
for every 1 < i < m. As a consequence, there exists 22 = 256 ECA, each of which can be indexed 
by a rule number that is computed as follows [25]: 
α0 • 20 + α1 • 21 + α2 • 22 + α3 • 23 + α4 • 2 4 + α5 • 25 + α
 6 • 26 + α7 • 27, 
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Boolean function f is: 
st -1 st st +1 -^ t +1 
0 0 0 -^ α
 0 
0 0 1 — > α1 
0 1 0 — > 
α2 
0 1 1 — > 
α3 
1 0 0 — > α4 
1 0 1 — > 
α
 5 
1 1 0 — > α
 6 
1 1 1 — > α
 7 
For example, the rule number of the ECA whose local transition function is 
150 
sit+1 = f(sit-1, +1 ) = sit - 1®s i t ®s i t + 
0 • 20 + 1 • 21 + 1 • 22 + 0 • 23 + 1 • 24 + 0 • 25 + 0 • 26 + 1 • 27, since its truth table is the 
following: 
^ t+1 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 -
0 1 0 -
0 1 1 -
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 = 0 
1 = 1 
0 = 1 
1 = 0 
0 = 1 
1 = 0 
0 = 0 
1 = 1 
As the number of cells of an ECA is finite, some boundary conditions must be stated in 
order to preserve the well-defined evolution. Usually one can take into account three types of 
boundary conditions: periodic boundary conditions (sti = stj if i = j (mod m) for every t), null 
Table 1. Rule numbers and ANF of affine ECA. 
Rule number ANF 
0 
15 
51 
60 
85 
90 
102 
105 
150 
153 
165 
170 
195 
204 
240 
255 
st+1 = 0 
st+1 = 1 ® sit - 1 
1 ® sti 
-1 + i+1 
si
t
-1 ® s 
-1 ® sit ® 
1 + st 
•>i+1 
t t 
s +1 
1®s i t 
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boundary conditions (sit = 0 for every t if i < 1 or i > m) and intermediate boundary conditions 
(s
 1 - k = s 1+k and sn+k = sn-k for every t and 1 ≤ k ≤ m). 
The ECA whose local transition function is an affine Boolean function is shown in Table 1. 
The vector C = (s1 t, s2 t,..., stm) ∈ F m 2 is called configuration of the ECA at time t. The whole 
evolution of a particular ECA can be comprised in its global transition function: 
$: Fm
 2 - Fm 2 
Ct - <P(Ct) = Ct+1. 
3. Cryptographic properties 
In order to resist the modern cryptanalytic attacks, highly nonlinear Boolean functions with good 
propagation criteria and less linear structure are needed [1-3,12]. The cryptanalytic attacks on 
each cryptosystem lead to criteria that the implemented cryptographic Boolean functions must 
satisfy. More precisely, the resistance of the cryptographic algorithms to the cryptanalytic attacks 
can be quantified through some fundamental properties (related to confusion and diffusion) on the 
Boolean functions involved in them. As a consequence, the design of this cryptographic functions 
needs to consider various characteristics simultaneously. 
In this sense, the most important cryptographic criteria for Boolean functions are the following 
[13,16,19]: algebraic degree, the balancedness, the resiliency, the nonlinearity, the propagation 
criterion (PC) and the non-existence of non-zero linear structures. Obviously, all of these char­
acteristics cannot be optimum at the same time and consequently trade-offs must be taken into 
account. In what follows, we describe the mentioned properties. 
3.1 The algebraic degree 
Cryptographic n-variable Boolean functions must have high algebraic degrees since otherwise 
the cryptographic protocols can be successfully cryptanalysed [8,9,17]. Nevertheless, we have to 
take into account that the n-variable Boolean functions with algebraic degrees n or 
optimally achieve other cryptographic properties such as nonlinearity or resiliency. 
3.2 Balancedness 
Cryptographic Boolean functions must be balanced, that is, their outputs must be uniformly 
distributed over F2. This properties allows one to avoid statistical dependence between the input 
and the output that can be used in some types of cryptanalytic attacks. 
3.3 Resiliency 
There is an additional condition to balancedness with special importance in the case of the design 
of stream ciphers: the m-resiliency. An n-variable Boolean function f is said to be m-resilient if 
it is a balanced function when we keep constant 0 < m ≤ n variables. If a Boolean function is 
not m-resilient then there exists a correlation between the output of the function and (at most) m 
coordinates of its input (correlation attack). Xiao and Massey [26] characterized the resiliency by 
means of the Walsh transform. 
THEOREM 3.1 An n-variable Boolean function f is m-resilient if and only if it is balanced and 
f(u) = 0 for all u ∈ F2 such that0 < w H (u) ≤ m. 
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3.4 The nonlinearity 
Cryptographic Boolean functions must lie at large Hamming distance to all affine Boolean 
functions. The nonlinearity of an n-variable Boolean function f is defined as 
(f) = min{dH(f, la)}; NL (   
a F
n 
in this sense, a Boolean function will be considered as highly nonlinear if its nonlinearity is 
near 2n. It is shown that N L(f) ≤ 2n-1 - 2n/2-1, and if the equality holds, f is called Bent 
function. Note that if n is odd, the last inequality for N L(f) cannot be an equality and in this 
case NL(f) ≤ 2 n -1 2(n-1)/2 
The Bent functions that are not balanced are not suitable for cryptographic purposes. As a 
consequence, it is necessary to study the n-variable Boolean functions that have large but not opti­
mal nonlinearities, say between 2n-1 - 2(n-1)/2 and 2n-1 - 2n/2-1, among which some balanced 
functions exist. 
3.5 The propagation criterion 
In order to assure well-diffusion properties, Boolean functions must satisfy the PC. This criterion 
was introduced by Preneel et al. [16] and it is based on the properties of the derivatives of  
Boolean functions that gives the behaviour of such functions when some variables of the input  
are complemented. The n-variable Boolean function f satisfies the PC with respect to B ⊂ F2  
if for every b ∈ B the derivative function, Dbf, is balanced. Moreover, the Boolean function f  
satisfies PC(k) if it satisfies PC with respect to the set 
W(k) = {b ∈ F2 - {0} such that w
 H(b) ≤ k}. 
The strict avalanche criterion (SAC) was introduced by Webster and Tavares [22] for the design  
of the Boolean functions involved in S-boxes. A Boolean function f satisfies SAC if changing any 
one of the n bits in the input x results in the output of the function being changed for exactly half  
of the 2n - 1 vectors x with the changed input bit. In fact, SAC was generalized into the propagation 
= 
3.6 Non-existence of non-zero linear structure 
Nonlinear n-variable Boolean functions with applications in cryptography (specially in block 
ciphers) should have no non-zero linear structures [5]. 
4. Analysis of the cryptographic properties of ECA 
In this section we will test the cryptographic properties of local transition functions of ECA, and 
the results obtained will be analysed. 
4.1 Testing the properties 
4.1.1 The algebraic degree 
The ECA whose local transition function is of algebraic degree 0 are two: the cellular automata 
defined by rule numbers 0 and 255. The ECA with algebraic degree 1 are the affine ECA except 
for 0 and 255. The ECA whose algebraic degree is 2 are: 
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3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36, 39, 40, 43, 45, 46, 48, 53, 54, 57, 
58, 63, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 75, 77, 78, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 96, 99, 101, 106, 108, 111, 113, 
114, 116, 119, 120, 123, 125, 126, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136, 139, 141, 142, 144, 147, 149, 
154, 156, 159, 160, 163, 166, 169, 172, 175, 177, 178, 183, 184, 187, 189, 190, 192, 197, 
198, 201, 202, 207, 209, 210, 212, 215, 216, 219, 221, 222, 225, 226, 228, 231, 232, 235, 
237, 238, 243, 245, 246, 249, 250, 252. 
Finally, the ECA whose local transition function is a three-variable Boolean function of degree 3 
are: 
4.1.2 Balancedness 
1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 47, 49, 50, 
52, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 79, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 
100, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 112, 115, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124, 127, 128, 131, 133, 134, 
137, 138, 140, 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, 171, 
173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186, 188, 191, 193, 194, 196, 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 
208, 211, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 223, 224, 227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 239, 241, 242, 
244, 247, 248, 251, 253, 254. 
A three-variable Boolean function is balanced when the number of 1s and 0s of its truth table is the 
same and equals to 4. A simple computation shows that the ECA whose local transition function 
is a balanced three-variable Boolean function are those defined by the following rule numbers: 
15, 23, 27, 29, 30, 39, 43, 45, 46, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 71, 75, 77, 78, 83, 85, 86, 89, 90, 
92, 99, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 113, 114, 116, 120, 135, 139, 141, 142, 147, 149, 150, 153, 
154, 156, 163, 165, 166, 169, 170, 172, 177, 178, 180, 184, 195, 197, 198, 201, 202, 204,  
209, 210, 212, 216, 225, 226, 228, 232, 240. 
4.1.3 Resiliency 
Only the local transition functions of some affine ECA are m-resilient. Speficically, the ECA with 
rule numbers 60, 90, 102, 105, 150, 153, 165, 195 are 1-resilient, whereas the ECA with rule 
numbers 105 and 150 are 2-resilient. There is not 3-resilient ECA. 
4.1.4 The nonlinearity 
For three-variable Boolean functions, it is MC(f) < 22 — 21 = 2. It is easy to check that the 
ECA whose nonlinearity is 0 are the affine ECA; the ECA with nonlinearity equals to 1 are 
1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 47, 49, 50, 
52, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 79, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 
100, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 112, 115, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124, 127, 128, 131, 133, 134, 
137, 138, 140, 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, 171, 
173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186, 188, 191, 193, 194, 196, 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 
208, 211, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 223, 224, 227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 239, 241, 242, 
244, 247, 248, 251, 253, 254. 
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Finally, the ECA with the possible maximum nonlinearity (N L(f ) = 2) are those defined by the 
following rule numbers: 
3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36, 39, 40, 43, 45, 46, 48, 53, 54, 57, 
58, 63, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 75, 77, 78, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 96, 99, 101, 106, 108, 111, 113, 
114, 116, 119, 120, 123, 125, 126, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136, 139, 141, 142, 144, 147, 149, 
154, 156, 159, 160, 163, 166, 169, 172, 175, 177, 178, 180, 183, 184, 187, 189, 190, 192, 
197, 198, 201, 202, 207, 209, 210, 212, 215, 216, 219, 221, 222, 225, 226, 228, 231, 232, 
235, 237, 238, 243, 245, 246, 249, 250, 252. 
4.1.5 The PC and the extended propagation criterion 
The ECA that satisfies PC(1) (and, consequently, satisfying the SAC) are: 
6, 9, 18, 20, 23, 24, 27, 29, 33, 36, 39, 40, 43, 46, 53, 58, 65, 66, 71, 72, 77, 78, 83, 92, 96, 
111, 113, 114, 116, 123, 125, 126, 129, 130, 132, 139, 141, 142, 144, 159, 163, 172, 177, 
178, 183, 184, 189, 190, 197, 202, 209, 212, 215, 216, 219, 222, 226, 228, 231, 232, 235, 
237, 246, 249, 
whereas the PC(2) is satisfied by the ECA with rule numbers: 23, 24, 36, 43, 66, 77, 113, 126, 
4.1.6 Non-existence of non-zero linear structure 
The nonlinear ECA without non-zero linear structures are those defined by the following rule 
numbers: 
1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 47, 49, 50, 
52, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 79, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 
100, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 112, 115, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124, 127, 128, 131, 133, 134, 
137, 138, 140, 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, 171, 
173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186, 188, 191, 193, 194, 196, 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 
208, 211, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 223, 224, 227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 239, 241, 242, 
244, 247, 248, 251, 253, 254. 
4.2 Discussion 
Taking into account the results shown in the last subsection, it is easy to check that there do not 
exist ECA satisfying the following properties at the same time: 
Algebraic degree of the local transition functions of the ECA: between 0 and 3. 
Balancedness. 
Non-existence of non-zero linear structures. 
Nonlinearity of the local transition functions of ECA: between 0 and 2. 
Resiliency: local transition functions 1-resilients and 2-resilients. 
Propagation criterion: PC(1) and PC(2). 
Consequently, it is shown that ECA cannot be used directly in the design of S-boxes or as 
combining functions for LFSRs outputs. Basically, it is due to the number of variables of local 
transition functions of ECA, which is only 3: note that in this case the Boolean functions with 
algebraic degrees n = 3 and n - 1 = 2 do not satisfy optimally the nonlinearity conditions, and 
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the functions of algebraic degree n - 2 = 1 are affine ECA! Nevertheless, it is also true that ECA 
can be used in the design of other cryptographic protocols as is mentioned in section 1, since other 
mathematical properties, such as statistical properties or reversibility properties, are required for 
its use in such protocols. Note that this properties often depends not on the local transition function 
but on the global transition function of the ECA (it is well known that the reversibility of ECA 
depends on its number of cells m, [4]). 
5. Conclusions and further work 
In this work, the cryptographic properties of Boolean functions that rules the evolution of the 
256 ECA were studied. Specifically, the following characteristics of local transition functions 
were tested: algebraic degree, balancedness, resiliency, nonlinearity, propagation criterion, and 
non-existence of non-zero linear structures. 
The main conclusion obtained from the results is that ECA cannot be used directly in the design 
of S-boxes (in block ciphers) or in the design of combining functions of the outputs of LFSRs (in 
stream ciphers). 
Further work is aimed at studying these properties with cellular automata whose neighbour-
hood’s cardinal is greater than 3. 
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